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upon whether the defendant has retained counsel for the matter in
question, while the federal rule turns upon whether formal proceedings have commenced against the defendant for the particular
charge upon which he or she is asked to participate in a line up.
SUPREME COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY
4
People v. Goldfinger 76

(decided January 25, 1991)

The defendant, Judith Goldfinger, sought to suppress secretly
tape recorded statements made by her to an agent of the New
York County District Attorney. Goldfinger claimed that her New
York State constitutional right to counsel 765 was violated because
the statements were obtained out of the presence of her attorney
who she had previously retained to defend her in federal civil
proceedings, the subject matter of which was based upon the
same transactions and occurences as the matter being investigated
by the district attorney's office. She claimed that this
constitutional violation should result in the suppression of her
tape recorded statements. The court held that her statements
should be suppressed because, although no formal criminal proceedings had yet begun, her retention of counsel related to all
matters concerning the transactions and occurences in question
and, therefore, she could not be questioned about them out of the
presence of her attorney. 7 66
In 1988, Goldfinger's employer, Cosmos Forms Ltd.
(Cosmos), filed a federal civil suit under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)7 6 7 against
Guardian Life Insurance Co. (Guardian), one of its corporate
764.
1991).
765.
766.
767.

149 Misc. 2d 765, 565 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Sup. Ct. New York County
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
Goidfinger, 149 Misc. 2d at 771, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (Supp. 1990).
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customers. Guardian counterclaimed against Cosmos and against
Goldflnger personally under the RICO statute, claiming that they
had defrauded and conspired against Guardian "by inflating
invoices for goods sold and delivered in 1987 and 1988."768
Guardian proceeded to bring another separate federal civil suit
against Goldfinger and one of her former co-workers based upon
the same claims. Goldfinger then obtained counsel to represent
her in these matters. One month later, in March of 1989, the
New York District Attorney's Office persuaded one of the
defendant's alleged co-conspirators, Lorraine Calderazzo, to
secretly tape record a conversation with Goldfinger concerning
the alleged wrongdoing. During the taped conversation,
Calderazzo represented to the defendant that the district attorney
had contacted her about the inflated invoices and asked the
defendant for advice on how to handle the matter. Defendant
made it clear that Calderazzo should not speak to the district
attorney's office under any circumstances and advised her to
retain a lawyer immediately. 769 At this time, no formal criminal
proceedings had yet begun. Six months later, the district attorney
presented these tape recordings to a grand jury, which ultimately
indicted Goldfinger.
Goldfinger maintained that because the district attorney's office
knew that she was represented by counsel on these matters in federal civil law suits, they were banned from questioning her about
these issues without the presence of her attorney. She alleged,
therefore, that the tape recorded conversation violated her state
constitutional right to counsel. The district attorney argued that
because the conversation was merely part of an informal
investigation, they should not have been barred from questioning
the suspect, who had retained counsel to represent her in separate
civil proceedings.
7 70 the New
The court noted that in 1990, in People v. Bing,
York Court of Appeals announced two instances in which one's
"right to counsel 'indelibly' attaches and cannot be waived in the
768. Goldfinger, 149 Misc. 2d at 766, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
769. Id. at 769, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
770. 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss3/42

2

et al.: Right to Counsel

964

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[VCol 8

771 In either instance, '[p]olice
absence of counsel ....
authorities may not question [the individuals] in the absence of

counsel.' "772

In Goldfinger, the prosecution's argument relied in part,
however, on the fact that at the time of the tape recorded
conversation, formal proceedings had not yet begun, and
defendant was not in custody during the questioning by the
district attorney's agent.
In addition to the rule established in Bing, the Goldfinger court
relied upon the rule stated by the New York Court of Appeals in
7 73
People v. Skinner:
[E]ven if the defendant has not been formally charged and is not
in custody, where "a defendant is known to have invoked the
right to and obtained the services of counsel on the matter about
which the person is questioned, the State may not use the statements elicited from that person in the absence of a waiver of
774
counsel made in the presence of the attorney."

The Goldfinger court rejected the prosecution's argument that
People v. Smith7 7 5 controlled and that Smith stood for the propo-

sition that the status of having obtained counsel in a civil
proceeding does not carry over to a criminal proceeding. 77 6 The
771. The right to counsel cannot be waived: 1) once formal proceedings
have commenced; and 2) when an uncharged individual in custody has retained
or requested an attorney. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 339, 558 N.E.2d at 1015, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 478.
772. Goldfinger, 149 Misc. 2d at 768, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 995 (quoting Bing,
76 N.Y.2d at 339, 558 N.E.2d at 1015, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 478) (footnote added
and alteration in original).
773. 52 N.Y.2d 24, 417 N.E.2d 501, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1980).
774. Goldfinger, 149 Misc. 2d at 769, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 995 (quoting
Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d at 32, 417 N.E.2d at 505, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 211)
(alteration in original).
775. 62 N.Y.2d 306, 465 N.E.2d 336, 476 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1984).
776. In Smith, the defendant was charged with third degree assault after
being issued a summons in family court for allegedly beating his stepson.
While the court of appeals noted that the two proceedings were wholly
different in nature, the case actually turned upon the fact that the defendant
never invoked his right to counsel in the original civil proceeding. Id. at 313,
465 N.E.2d at 340, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
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Goldfingercourt noted that "the critical factor in the [Smith] case
was that the defendant had never invoked his right to counsel or
in fact retained counsel in the earlier neglect proceeding. "' 777 The
Smith court actually stated that a defendant may waive his or her
right to counsel in the absence of an attorney if 1) the proper
Mirandawarnings are given, and 2) if "the person has not in fact
retained counsel in relation to the neglect proceeding." 77 8
Instead of determining whether the right to counsel attatched
based upon the status of the proceeding or whether the defendant
was in custody at the time counsel was requested, as demanded in
Bing, the Goldfinger court determined that the issue should turn
upon whether counsel was obtained to aid the defendant on the
subject matter in question, as established in Skinner ten years
prior to the Bing decision:
[Tihe critical factor in the case was that the defendant had never
invoked his right to counsel or in fact retained counsel in the
earlier neglect proceeding: "When interrogated by police investigating the potential criminal charges, such a person may waive
the right to counsel in the absence of counsel, provided that
Miranda warnings, if required by the circumstances of the interrogation, are properly given and that the person has not in fact
retainedcounsel in relation to the neglect proceeding."779
Finally, the court noted that its decision was not meant to
"shield [defendant] against future or ongoing crimes, or from
other forms of police observations or investigations." ' 780 The
only question considered was that of the right to counsel of
defendant when questioned on the same subject matter as that for
which she had previously retained an attorney. Based on Skinner,
the court granted Goldfinger's motion to suppress the statements
because she could not be questioned about the same subject
matter outside of the presence of her attorney.
There is no federal case law directly addressing the issue pre777. Goldfinger, 149 Misc. 2d at 770, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
778. Smith, 62 N.Y.2d at 309, 465 N.E.2d at 337, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
779. Goldfinger, 149 Misc. 2d at 770, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 996 (quoting
Smith, 62 N.Y.2d at 309, 465 N.E.2d at 337, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 789)
(alteration in original).
780. Id. at 771, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
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sented in Goldfinger. However, a long line of federal case law
suggests that the right to counsel would not attach from a federal
civil proceeding to a criminal one, even if the two matters stem
from the same set of transactions and occurences. In Escobedo v.
Illinois,78 1 an unindicted murder suspect was denied his Sixth
Amendment 7 82 right to speak with his lawyer during an incustody police interrogation. 783 In its analysis, the United States
Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in Massiah v.
United States, 784 in which it established the right of an indicted
defendant to the aid of counsel under the Sixth Amendment
during a police interrogation. 7 85 The Escobedo Court stated that
attachment of the right to counsel is not conditioned upon the
absence of an indictment. 7 86 There is no pragmatic change in
status once a suspect has become an "accused" and the matter
has, for all intents and purposes, ceased to become an "unsolved
crime." 787 However, this broad dicta was essentially rendered
meaningless when the Court limited its decision, that defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated, to the facts
of that case. 7 88 For this reason, the Court has subsequently
89
declined to rely or expand upon the Escobedo decision. 7
After Escobedo, the Court decided a line of cases based upon
whether counsel was denied to an accused during a "critical
stage" of the adjudicatory process. 790 The Court has stated that
781. 378 U.S. 478 (1964), overruled, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).

782. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
783. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 481.
784. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
785. Id.at 206.
786. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485.
787. Id.
788. Id.at 492.
789. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429 (1986) (stating that
"subsequent decisions foreclose any reliance on Escobedo and Miranda for the
proposition that the Sixth Amendment right, in any of its manifestations,
applies prior to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings"); Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (noting that "the court has limited the
holding of Escobedo to its own facts...").

790. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attatches at stages "where
the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial
itself to a mere formality." ' 79 1 Such stages have been held to
include arraignment, 7 92 preliminary hearings, 793 post-indictment
line-ups 794 and pre-indictment corporeal identifications during a
judicial proceeding. 795 At the very least, the Court has held that
a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attatches "at or
after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against
him

",,796

In Kirby v. Illinois,797 the Supreme Court noted that all prior
case law recognizing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
"involved points of time at or after the initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings - whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment." 798 The Court declined to extend the Sixth Amendment
constitutional right to counsel, afforded to a defendant in a post
indictment pre-trial line-up, 799 to a defendant in a pre-indictment
police station show up that had occured before any formal
proceedings had commenced:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere
formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has
committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse
positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then
that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces
of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substan800
tive and procedural criminal law.
The fact that an attorney had not yet been retained by defendant
791. Id. at 224.
792. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
793. See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963).

794.
795.
796.
797.

See Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37.
See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 229 (1977).
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
406 U.S. 682 (1972).

798. Id. at-689.
799. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).

800. Kirby, 682 U.S. at 689.
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was inapposite because the Court concluded that the right to have
an attorney present does not attach until formal proceedings have
commenced.
More recently, in Maine v. Moulton, 8° 1 the United States
Supreme Court stated that incriminating statements made to an
undercover government agent concerning matters upon which the
defendant was not formally charged could not be suppressed
based upon a violation of the Sixth Amendment. 802 In Moulton,
defendant Perley Moulton, and his codefendant Gary Colson,
were charged with four counts of theft. Subsequent to their
indictments and release on bail, Colson cooperated with police to
secretly tape record conversations with Moulton in attempting to
803
elicit incriminating statements concerning unrelated crimes.
Moulton ultimately made incriminating statements concerning the
crimes that he had already been indicted for and statements
concerning unrelated crimes. 804 The Supreme Court held that the
statements concerning the crimes for which proceedings had
begun were to be suppressed because they were elicited
subsequent to the attatchment of defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. 80 5 However, the Court would not suppress the
evidence concerning matters for which formal proceedings had
not yet commenced:
[Tlo exclude evidence pertaining to charges as to which the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the
evidence was obtained, simply because other charges were
pending at that time, would unnecessarily frustrate the public's
interest in the investigation of criminal activities. Consequently,
incriminating statements pertaining to pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those charges, notwithstanding the fact
that the police were also investigating other crimes .... 806

Further, in Moran v. Burbine,807 the Supreme Court rejected
801.
802.
803.
804.
805.
806.
807.

474 U.S. 159 (1985).
Id. at 180.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 180.
475 U.S. 412 (1986).
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defendant's argument that "the Sixth Amendment protects the
integrity of the attorney-client relationship regardless of whether
the prosecution has in fact commenced 'by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment.' 80 8 The defendant's sister, Ms. Munson, retained counsel
for him on the breaking and entering charge for which he was
being' held. The defendant was unaware of his sister's actions.
Ms. Munson informed the police that her brother was represented
by counsel and, thus, should not be questioned. Ms. Munson was
assured that defendant would not be questioned. Despite this
assurance, the defendant was interrogated one hour later, albeit
not on the breaking and entering charge, but upon a suspicion of
murder.809 No formal proceedings had yet commenced
concerning the murder investigation. The defendant, not knowing
that counsel had been retained for him, waived his Miranda
rights and proceeded to sign written admissions. The defendant
later moved to suppress these statements as a violation of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 8 10 The Court stated that the
Sixth Amendment only comes into effect after the initiation of
formal charges; this is when the government shifts from investigation to accusation. 811 Moreover, the Court wrote:
More importantly, the suggestion that the existence of an attorney-client relationship itself triggers the protections of the Sixth
Amendment misconceives the underlying purposes of the right to
counsel. The Sixth Amendment's intended function is not to
wrap a protective cloak around the attorney-client relationship
for its own sake any more than-it is to protect a suspect from the
consequences of his own candor. Its purpose, rather, is to assure
that in any "criminal prosecutio[n]" . . . the accused shall not be
left to his own devices in facing the "prosecutorial forces of
organized society." ' 812
Once again, the Court stated the rule that the Sixth Amendment
808. Id. at 428-29 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188

(1984)).
809. Id. at 417.
810. Id. at 417-18.
811. Id. at 430-31.
812. Id. at 430 (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689).
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attaches only upon the initiation of formal proceedings, even if
defendant had retained counsel upon another unrelated criminal
charge.
Most recently, the Court reaffirmed its position in Illinois v.
Perkins.8 13 In Perkins, defendant made incriminating statements
concerning a murder to an undercover government agent, while
incarcerated on unrelated charges. His statements made to the
undercover agent were subsequently used as a basis to charge him
with murder.8 14 The Court concluded that police cannot use
undercover agents to circumvent one's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel once that person has been charged with a crime.
However, because no charges had been filed concerning the
murder investigation, the defendant's statements did not have to
be suppressed and "Sixth Amendment precedents [were] not
applicable." 8 15
Therefore, an analogy between the New York State
constitutional right to counsel and the United States constitutional
right to counsel discloses an inconsistency. The Goldfinger court
illustrates the willingness of New York courts to carryover the
right to counsel guaranteed by the New York State Constitution
when an attorney has siinply been retained on a matter
concerning the same transaction and occurences as the matter in
question. However, the United States Supreme Court has made it
clear that the federal rule is well established and a defendant's
right to counsel under the United States Constitution does not
come into effect unless formal charges have been commenced. It
is clear that Judith Goldf'mger would not be allowed to suppress
her tape recorded statements under the federal rule simply
because she had previously retained counsel. Further, the fact
that no formal proceedings had commenced at the time of the
secretly taped conversation also lends itself to the conclusion that
her statements could not be suppressed. The only unanswered
question concerns the fact that Judith Goldfinger had retained
counsel on civil charges that were derived from the same set of
813. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
814. Id. at 2395-96.
815. Id. at 2398-99.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1992

9

Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1992], Art. 42

1992]

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

971

transactions and occurrences as the state criminal matter being
investigated. The charges were not wholly unrelated. In each of
the federal cases discussed above, the Court's decision was based
upon the finding that the defendant had previously retained
counsel on an unrelated criminal charge.
While this issue has not been directly addressed by the federal
courts, the rule seems to be firmly established that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not attach under any circumstances unless formal proceedings have commenced. Therefore, it
is quite unlikely that Goldfinger would ultimately have been
afforded the federal right to counsel under the United States
Constitution in these circumstances. Notably, Goldfinger only
claimed a violation of her New York State constitutional right to
counsel.
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